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The Tribal Right to Exclude Non-Tribal Members from IndianOwned Lands.
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
Last May, two Indian tribes in South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux and Oglala
Sioux Tribes, invoking the dangers caused by Covid-19, established health safety checkpoints on
state and federal roads accessing the entrance to their reservations. The South Dakota governor
immediately threatened legal action, arguing that such roadblocks could only happen pursuant to
an agreement with the State. 1 Later that summer, the Blackfeet Nation in northern Montana
refused to open its access road to tourists wanting to visit Glacier National Park. 2 Unlike in
South Dakota, the Montana Governor supported the Tribe’s decision. In South Dakota, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe argued that the Tribal checkpoints were legal because the tribe had
a “treaty right to exclude” non-members from its reservation.3 Besides the treaty right to
exclude, the tribes can also claim that as sovereign nations they have the inherent power to
control their borders. This article does not focus on the Covid-19 issues facing the tribes. Others
have already done this. 4 Instead, it casts a wider net and examines from a general perspective the
Tribes’ power to exclude non-members from their reservations.
When it comes to inherent tribal powers to control people who are not members of the
tribe, hereinafter referred to as non-members, the Supreme Court in a 1981 case, Montana v.
United States,5 announced a somewhat new principle that unless one of two exceptions applied,
as a general rule Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of the inherent sovereign power to
control the activities of non-members on lands owned by non-members within the reservation.
This doctrine would become known as the implicit divestiture doctrine. 6 Besides its inherent
sovereign power, the Crow Tribe in Montana had also invoked its treaty right to exclude non•

S.J Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. J.D.
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.
1
That lawsuit was never filed. Instead, the Governor asked for the help of the Federal government which
eventually threatened to cancel a number of contracts it had with the two tribes unless they complied with
the request to dismantle their roadblocks. One of these tribe eventually filed a lawsuit asking for
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the federal government to make good on its threat. The facts
as stated here are taken from the tribal complaint which was filed on June 23, 2020, case 1:20-cv-01709.
The complaint is available on the June 24th Turtle Blog.
2
See Washington Post article “A closed border, pandemic-weary tourists and a big bottleneck at Glacier
National Park, available in the Turtle Blog and June 13, 2020.
3
The letter was issued on May 8th 2020. It is available on the May 11th Turtle Blog.
4
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemic and Inherent Tribal Powers, 73 Stanford
Law Review On Line, June 2020.
5
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
6
See discussion at notes 17-25.
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members from the reservation, arguing that this right includes the lesser right to regulate those
who are allowed to stay on the land. The Court held, however, that when Congress opened a
reservation for land to be acquired by non-members, it implies a congressional intent to abrogate
the treaty right to exclude on such acquired lands.7 In addition, because neither of the two
exceptions to Montana’s general rule were available, the Crow tribe could not control fishing
activities by non-members on the Big Horn River within its reservation since the bed of the river
was now owned by the State.
For twenty years, the Montana general rule was not applied to limit tribal jurisdiction
over non-member activities taking place on tribal or Indian owned land. 8 However, in 2001, the
Supreme Court unanimously extended the Montana principle to Indian owned land in Nevada v.
Hicks.9 It has now been almost twenty years since Hicks was decided and an analysis of the
cases show that lower courts have disagreed on when to apply Montana to assertion of tribal
jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned lands. One of the main reason for this lack of
consistency is that although unanimous in its holding that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving state law enforcement officials as defendants, the Hicks
Court was badly divided on the reasoning for the holding. In effect, even though Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion for the Court, there were two other opinions, consisting of three
Justices each,10 each adopting a different view of what role the status of the land played in
determining whether the tribe had jurisdiction.11
Many noted scholars have addressed the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-members
comprehensively.12 Notably, Professor Judith Royster in a perceptive 2015 article covered some

Id., at 558-559, stating “If the 1868 treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian hunting
and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians… this tribal
“authority could only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation.”
8
See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408
(1980);
9
533 U.S. 353 (2001),
10
In addition to the Scalia opinion, Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas. Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in part joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens.
11
There was also a concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself, and a concurring opinion
by Justice Stevens joined by Justice Breyer that did not add much of anything new to Justice O’Connor’s
opinion which these two Justices also had joined.
12
See e.g. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779
(2014) Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, Reimagining Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1499 (2013), Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for
Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010).
7
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of the same grounds this article will be addressing.13 Like her, I also take the position that
Montana should not apply to lands in which tribes have retained the right to exclude. 14
However, in concluding that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks is neither intelligible nor
doctrinally helpful,”15 Professor Royster did not try to make sense of Justice Scalia’s heavy
reliance on the State’s interests in law enforcement. In this Article, I make two arguments. The
first one is that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks can be conceptualized as using the state interest
in law enforcement to support the finding that the tribe had lost the right to exclude state law
enforcement officials in the case. In effect, Hicks could be read as requiring a two-step analysis
to determine if an Indian tribe has retained jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned
lands. First, courts should determine whether a tribe has retained its right to exclude. If the
answer is yes, this is the end of the inquiry and the tribe has jurisdiction. If the answer is no, step
two requires courts to apply the Montana framework in determining whether one or both of the
exceptions to Montana’s general rule apply to preserve tribal jurisdiction. The second argument
is that Hicks should have really been decided as a state jurisdiction case. The results would have
been the same as a finding of state jurisdiction in this case should have preempted tribal court
jurisdiction. However, in the long run, relying on state jurisdiction as preempting tribal
jurisdiction would have been potentially less harmful to tribal sovereignty and would not have
generated the same degree of confusion and difference of opinions among the circuits.
In addition, this article analyzes whether there should be a difference between a tribal
treaty right to exclude non-members from the reservations and the “inherent sovereign” right to
exclude when it comes to decide whether such a “right to exclude” has been abrogated.
Professor Royster took the position that there should not be any difference, stating “Not all
Indian tribes have treaties with the federal government. When it comes to tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers on Indian lands based on treaty rights, where does that leave tribes without formal
treaties? The answer, I submit, is in exactly the same place as tribes with treaties.” 16 In this
Article, I take the position that this may not necessarily be the case.
To explore these issues, Part I will explain the Court’s jurisprudence when it comes to tribal
control over non-members. Part II will analyze the on-going debate among the Federal Circuit
13

See Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers on Trust Lands, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2015).
14
Id., stating “Over the years, discussions of the Montana-Hicks line of cases seem to start and end with
the question of inherent tribal authority over nonmembers… The treaty rights approach has been lost in
the discussion and needs to be revived. This Article intends to bring the treaty rights argument--that
Indian tribes have rights to govern on trust lands recognized by treaty and treaty-equivalents--back to the
forefront. Id., at 892.
15
16

If., at 904.
Royster, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 889, 919.
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Court of Appeals concerning the interpretation of Hicks and concludes by arguing that Hicks
should be re-imagined as a state jurisdiction case. Finally, after exploring the differences, if any,
between the tribes’ sovereign right to exclude and their treaty right to exclude, PART III looks at
the right to exclude beyond tribal jurisdiction over non-members, namely the role the right to
exclude plays when it comes to determining whether federal laws of general applicability should
apply to Indian tribes.
Part I: The implicit divestiture doctrine and the right to exclude from Montana to Hicks
and beyond.
1. Montana v. United States: The “path-marking” case.17
The main issue in Montana was whether the tribe had the authority to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-members on land determined by the Court to be non-Indian fee land located
within the Crow Indian reservation. The tribe first argued that its 1868 treaty with the United
States granted such tribal authority because Article II of the treaty not only established a
reservation for the Crow Tribe, but also provided that it be “set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named.”18 The Court disagreed with this
argument. While recognizing that “the treaty obligated the United States to prohibit most nonIndians from residing on or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe,
and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and hunting on
those lands,”19 the Court held that this authority “could only extend to land on which the Tribe
exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.”20 Since the land in question was now
owned by the State, the Tribe could no longer exercise undisturbed use and occupation.
Having disposed of the treaty argument, the Court addressed whether the Tribe could
nevertheless control non-members under its inherent sovereign power. Writing for the Court,
Justice Stewart announced what, at the time, seemed to have been a new principle that the
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.” 21 After stating this
principle, Justice Stewart held that as a “general proposition,” the inherent powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” 22

450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana was first referred as “path-marking” in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
18
15 Stat. 649
19
Id., at 558
20
Id., at 559
21
Id., at 564
22
Id., at 565.
17
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The Court, however, identified two exceptions to its general rule. The first exception, now
known as the consensual relations exception, allows tribes “to regulate through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter into consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”23 The second exception, known as the tribal self-government exception,
allows tribal civil authority over the conduct of non-members (even on fee lands within the
reservation) “when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.” 24 Unfortunately for the Crow Tribe,
however, neither of the exceptions applied to this case.25
2. Strate v. A-1- Contractors: Equating tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction with tribal
regulatory power.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,26 the issue was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over a
lawsuit filed by one non-member against another non-member over a routine fender bender
accident that happened within the reservation but on a road over which the state had obtained a
right of way. In holding that the tribal court had no jurisdiction, the opinion brought three
important clarifications, or perhaps modifications, to the Montana analysis. First it clarified that
in order to be considered “Indian owned“ land for the purposes of the Montana analysis, the
Tribe had to have retained a “gatekeeper” role in excluding non-members from the area. 27
Secondly, and more importantly, it held that the Montana analysis was applicable to both tribal
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction because “as to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction cannot exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”28 This meant that in order to determine
whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a non-member defendant, courts only have to ask
whether the tribal council could have regulated the non-member activity on the land in question.
Third, the Court considerably narrowed the scope of the tribal self-government exception to

23

Id.
Id.
25
Id., at 566, stating, “No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian
hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal regulation.”
26
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
27
Id., at 456. Since the tribe had not maintained that role here, the Court ruled that the state right of way
was the equivalent of non-member fee land for the purposes of the Montana analysis.
28
520 U.S. at 453.
24
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Montana’s general rule by holding that having jurisdiction over non-members driving on state
roads within reservations was not necessary to the health and welfare of the tribes.29
Unlike in Strate, where the location of the accident was clear and undisputed, determining
where, for the purposes of the Montana analysis, the crucial facts took place can be a
complicated question.30 For instance, in Wilson v. Horton’s Towing,31 a tribal police officer
suspected that Wilson, a non-Indian, was driving while inebriated. The officer stopped Wilson
on a state road within the reservation. After finding drugs in the vehicle, the tribal officer called
a state trooper, who arrested the non-Indian driver for a DWI and had his truck impounded off
the reservation. The next day, the Lummi Tribal Court issued a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to
Institute Forfeiture,” because under the Lummi Nation tribal code, possession of marijuana over
one ounce is a ground for civil forfeiture. Eventually, Horton’s Towing released the truck to the
tribe and Wilson brought suit in federal court against Horton’s Towing and the arresting tribal
officer.
Finding that there was a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that
the non-Indian had to exhaust his tribal remedies before bringing his suit in federal court.32 After
stating that in this case, “the threshold question is whether Plaintiff’s claim “bears some direct
connection to tribal lands,” the Court noted that the driver was found with several containers of
marijuana in his truck immediately after leaving the tribal casino. Therefore, although the driver
was stopped on a state road, “one could logically conclude that the forfeiture was a response to
his unlawful possession of marijuana while on tribal land. So interpreted, the events giving rise
to the conversion claim reveal a “direct connection to tribal lands.” 33
3. Nevada v. Hicks:34 The origin of the confusion.
Nevada v. Hicks involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court by a member of the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes of western Nevada against the State of Nevada and its state officials. Hicks
If., at 459, stating “Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at
issue is needed to preserve “the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”
30
See for instance discussion of MacArthur v. San Juan County, infra at notes 67-73 and Belcourt Public
School District v. Herman, infra at notes 59-60.
31
906 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2018).
32
The requirement that a party should first exhaust the available tribal remedies before filing in federal
court arguing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction was first promulgated in National Farmers
Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57, (1985) and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15–
16, (1987)
33
906 F.3d at 780. See also Employer’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Branch, 381 F.Supp.3d 1144 (2019)
where the court found that none of the contracts made by a non-reservation Insurance Co. with a nonIndian contractor, whose employees negligently caused a massive fuel leak on the reservation, were made
on the reservation. Therefore, the Insurance Co. was not subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal court.
34
533 U.S. 353 (2001).
29
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alleged that state game wardens had violated his civil rights and damaged his property when they
came on the reservation to search his house for evidence related to an off-reservation crime,
hunting out of season, he was alleged to have committed. The State's game wardens were acting
pursuant to warrants issued by both the state and the tribal court. The main issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over the non-member defendants.
The Tribe’s main argument was that that the Montana analysis was not applicable since the nonmember state law enforcement officials’ activities relevant to the lawsuit took place on Indian
owned land.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court and held that the tribal court lacked
jurisdiction. Although he was joined by five other Justices, Justice Souter wrote a concurring
opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, where he stated “While I agree with the Court's
analysis as well as its conclusion, I would reach that point by a different route... [w]hile the
Court gives emphasis to measuring tribal authority here in light of the State's interest in
executing its own legal process to enforce state law governing off-reservation conduct, I would
go right to Montana's rule.”35 Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and
Stevens, concurring in part and arguing that while she was concurring in the result because she
believed the state officials had sovereign immunity, she would have remanded to the lower
courts on the issue of whether the tribe had jurisdiction under the Montana exceptions.
The question here is why did Justice Scalia not go directly to the Montana rule as Justice
Souter did? There are, I think, three possible interpretations of Justice Scalia’s opinion.
The first one, followed in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, 36 is that Scalia was in fact just
performing a Montana analysis. Under that interpretation, Hicks stands for the proposition that
the Montana general rule of no-tribal jurisdiction over non-members extends to all lands within
Indian reservations. For sure, language used by Justice Scalia towards the end the end of the
Opinion suggested as much when he stated
“tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations—
to “the right to make laws and be ruled by them.” The State's interest in execution of
process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs
the tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state
government.37

35

Id., at 375.
See discussion infra at notes 50-66.
37
533 U.S. at 364.
36
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A second interpretation of the Scalia Opinion, followed in the latest Tenth Circuit opinion, 38
is that the Court considered the state law enforcement interests at issue because its holding is
limited to denying tribal jurisdiction over state law enforcement officials conducting criminal
investigations on the reservation. This was the position taken by Justice Ginsburg in her short
concurring opinion 39 Also supporting that interpretation is the majority’s statement in a footnote
that “our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state
officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmember defendants in general.”40 Under that interpretation, the Court does consider the
state’s interests in law enforcement but it does so in a Montana type analysis to determine
whether it outweighs the Tribal interest in self-government as described in the second Montana
exception.
A third possible understanding of the opinion, followed by the Ninth Circuit, 41 is that
Justice Scalia first determined that the tribe had in fact lost the right to exclude state agents from
the reservation in cases involving circumstances such as were present here. Thus, instead of first
evaluating whether any of the Montana exceptions apply, courts should proceed on debating the
importance of the state’s interests inside the reservation to determine whether the Tribe has lost
the right to exclude these state law-enforcement officials from Indian-owned lands. In other
words, the balancing of the tribal and state interests at stake is done to determine if the tribe has
lost the right to exclude. It is only after the Tribe is found to have lost the right to exclude that
the Montana analysis becomes applicable.
4. Post Hicks Supreme Court cases.
Although the Supreme Court had a possibility to comment on Hicks twice since 2001, neither
cases added much to the debate. In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch, 42 the issue
was whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by tribal members claiming
that a non-Indian bank had discriminated against them in the sale of a parcel of non-Indian fee
land within the reservation. The Supreme Court held that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over
the non-member defendant because the tribe had lost the right to regulate the sale of non-Indian
fee land on the reservation. Allowing the tribe to invoke its tort law in this case would allow the
tribal court to control the sale of such non-Indian fee land. The Court hardly mentioned Hicks.43
38

See Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017) and discussion infra at notes 67-74.
533 U.S. 353, at 386 (Justice Ginsburg concurring.)
40
Id., at footnote 2.
41
See discussion, infra, at notes 75-100.
42
554 U.S. v. 316 (2008)
43
Although it did quote from the opinion for the purposes of stating “Tribal assertion of regulatory
authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them.” Id., at 335.
39
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However, it did state that Montana’s “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember
activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's
activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians,”44 thus at least implying that
Montana was applicable to activities on both Indian and non-Indian land within the reservations.
Of course, it is essential to understand that the debate here is not whether the Montana
analysis is applicable to all reservation lands. It clearly potentially is. The debate is when
should the analysis take place: directly as Justice Souter did in Hicks, or after the Court weighs
the state interest as Justice Scalia arguably did.
The other case, Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, ended in a 4-4 draw
without a decision,45 thereby affirming the decision below which had upheld tribal court
jurisdiction over a non-Indian Corporation.46 The 5th Circuit in Dolgencorp had upheld tribal
jurisdiction over a lawsuit by the Tribe against a non-Indian corporation whose employee was
alleged to have sexually abused a minor tribal member who was working for the corporation at a
store located on tribal land. The Circuit court upheld tribal jurisdiction under Montana’s
commercial relationship exception,47 and never mentioned, let alone discuss Nevada v. Hicks
even though the alleged wrongdoing occurred on land the tribe had leased to the corporation. 48
Needless to say, the three Hicks plurality opinions and the perplexing structure of Scalia’s
main opinion have created a divergence of opinions among the lower courts for the last twenty
years. The Supreme Court has never revisited the issue since the only opinion issues since Hicks
in the area of tribal jurisdiction over non-members involved non-Indian fee land.49 The next Part
discusses the various positions adopted by the Circuits and proposes to re-imagine Hicks as a
state jurisdiction case.
PART II: The Federal Circuits debate on when to extend Montana to Indian owned
lands within reservations.
1. The 7th and 8th Circuits approach: interpreting Hicks as always extending
Montana to all reservation lands owned by the Tribes or their members.
The first category of cases are those that have followed Justice Souter’s Hicks concurrence
and have extended Montana directly to all lands within the reservations, Indian and non-Indian
owned. In Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
44

Id., at 328.
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)
46
746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
47
Id., at 173-174.
48
It seems that the District Court in the case had adopted a broad interpretation of Hicks and the Tribe
decided to focus its appeal on the applicability of the Montana exceptions. 846 F.Supp.2d 646, 651.
49
See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
45
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Indians,50 the Seventh Circuit specifically disagreed with the proposition that Hicks was of
limited applicability when it came to tribal jurisdiction over Indian owned lands. The case
involved a lawsuit filed by a tribal entity in tribal court wanting to invalidate a sale of tribal
bonds made with a non-Indian bank. The sale of the bonds occurred on Indian owned land.
Answering the tribal argument that Montana only applies to situations in which tribes
attempt to regulate nonmember conduct on non-Indian fee land, as opposed to tribal trust land,
the court stated “We do not believe that these conclusions can be reconciled with the language
that the Court employed in Hicks.”51 The court first focused on language in Hicks stating that
“The ownership status of land, is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation
of the activities of nonmembers is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations.”52 The court then analyzed Plains Commerce Bank, and concluded that the
statement that Montana 's “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities
taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's activity occurs
on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians”53 left no doubt that ”Montana applies regardless of
whether the actions take place on fee or non-fee land.”54
The Eight Circuit has also adopted a broad definition of Hicks. In Attorney’s Process and
Investigation v. Sac and Fox Tribe,55 the non-Indian defendant (API) had sent a group of armed
men to take over the tribal casino on behalf of a competing tribal political faction. Although the
Court relied on the second Montana exception (threat to tribal health and welfare, political
integrity and economic security) to uphold the jurisdiction of the tribal court, 56 it stated
Although the issue in the Montana case was about tribal regulatory authority over
nonmember fee land within the reservation, Montana's analytic framework now sets the
outer limits of tribal civil jurisdiction—both regulatory and adjudicatory—over
nonmember activities on tribal and nonmember land... The Court has also indicated that
“Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”57

50

807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015)
51
Id., at 207.
52
Id.
53
Id., at 206-207
54
Id., at 208.
55
609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010).
56
Stating “because API's forceful intervention on October 1, 2003 threatened the “political integrity, the
economic security, [and] the health [and] welfare” of the Tribe, as well as its rights as a landowner, the
tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over the claims that arise out of that conduct,” Id., at 940.
57
Id., at 936.
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Towards the end of its opinion the Court did mention that the tribe had a right to exclude nonmembers from tribally owned land but it only invoked that right as part of the Montana
framework.58
In a more recent case, Belcourt Public School District v. Herman,59 the 8th Circuit
applied Montana to deny tribal jurisdiction over the school district on what may have been
Indian-owned land. The case involved multiple employment related claims by tribal employees
against the school district. Although the status of the land as Indian or non-Indian owned was
not clear, the Court disposed of this issue by stating in a footnote “there is scant evidence in the
record what, if any, land and facilities relevant to this case were owned by the Tribe.
Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and facilities relevant to this case—which is
not supported by the record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis would not change.”60
The Court never mentioned the tribal right to exclude.
The first part of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hicks tends to support the 7th and 8th
Circuits position. Thus, after stating that “Both Montana and Strate rejected tribal authority to
regulate nonmembers' activities on land over which the tribe could not “assert a landowner's
right to occupy and exclude,”61 and remarking that the land status was central to the analysis of
the Court in previous cases, he concluded that “the reason that was so was not that Indian
ownership suspends the “general proposition”… that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe” 62 He followed that by noting that
the Montana Court clearly implied that its general rule was applicable throughout the reservation
when it stated that Indian tribes retain some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians “even on
non-Indian fee lands.”63 Finally after remarking that who owns the land is only one factor to
Stating “Finally, there remains “the critical importance of land status” to questions of tribal
jurisdiction… Here the Tribe does not seek to assert jurisdiction over non Indian fee land. The facilities
API raided are on tribal trust land. The Tribe's trespass and trade secret claims thus seek to regulate API's
entry and conduct upon tribal land, and they accordingly “stem from the tribe's ‘landowner's right to
occupy and exclude... Tribal civil authority is at its zenith when the tribe seeks to enforce regulations
stemming from its traditional powers as a landowner. 609 F.3d at 940.
59
786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015).
60
Id., at 660 n.5. For an almost identical 8th Circuit case, see Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy,
786 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2015), stating at footnote 6, “]T]his court is aware that “[t]he ownership status of
land” is “one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is
‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’ ” As noted above, however,
there is scant evidence in the record what land and facilities relevant to this case were owned by the Tribe.
Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and facilities relevant to this case—which is not
supported by the record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis would not change for the reasons
stated herein.”
61
Id., at 359.
62
Id.
63
Id., at 360.
58
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consider in determining whether tribal regulation of nonmembers is necessary to protect tribal
self-government, he stated “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support
regulatory jurisdiction over non-members.”64
In a later part of the opinion, after remarking that the major criticism of Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence was that “our reasoning “gives only passing consideration to the fact that the state
officials' activities in this case occurred on land owned and controlled by the Tribes,” 65 Justice
Scalia asserted
To the contrary, we acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor in
the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it “may sometimes be ...
dispositive.” We simply do not find it dispositive in the present case, when weighed
against the State's interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws. 66
This statement implies that it was a “Montana analysis” that the Court was performing. But
what of Justice Scalia invocation of the State’s interests in law enforcement before concluding
that the Tribal court did not have jurisdiction in the case? The State’s interests had never been
part of any Montana analysis under which the courts are supposed to evaluate whether
jurisdiction of non-members is necessary to tribal self-government. There are two other
interpretations of the Court’s Hicks opinion that make more sense of Scalia’s invocation of the
state interests.
2. The Tenth Circuit approach: From a broad interpretation of Hicks to one limiting it to
cases involving strong state law enforcement interests.
An early Tenth Circuit decision was MacArthur v. San Juan County. 67 The case involved
tribal members employed by a health clinic who were challenging certain administrative actions
taken by the clinic. Whether the alleged wrongful conduct of the non-members occurred on what
can be classified as Indian or non-Indian fee land was debatable. Although the clinic started out
as part of a County Health Services district, the County relinquished operation of the Clinic on
January 1, 2000, at which time the Utah Navajo Health Systems, an entity affiliated with the
Navajo tribe, took over operation. Although the Tenth Circuit took the position that “The record
indicates that the land on which the Clinic is located is fee land owned by the State of Utah as
part of the Navajo Trust Fund,”68 it did address Hicks’s extension to Indian owned land, stating
The notion that Montana's applicability turns, in part, on whether the regulated activity
took place on non-Indian land was finally put to rest in Hicks. … Because the activities
64
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Id., at 370.
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497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).
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occurred on Indian land, Hicks argued that Montana had no relevance. In rejecting that
argument, the Court explained that… language from Montana itself clearly implied that
the general rule announced in that case applies to Indian and non-Indian land alike.69
In a more recent decision, however, Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe,70 the Tenth Circuit
seemed to take a much narrower view of Hicks. In Norton, the Ute Tribe was suing state police
officers who had trespassed unto tribal land while chasing a car occupied by a pair of tribal
members. In the ensuing pursuit, Murray who was the passenger in the fleeing car ended up dead
from a gunshot wound to the head. The parties disagreed as to whether Murray committed
suicide as the state police claimed or whether he was shot by the police.
The Court first addressed the right to exclude and stated “In light of these repeated
confirmations of tribes' right to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands, we think it plausible that
the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over the trespass claim.”71 The Court then addressed the
argument that Hicks had changed the lay of the land. After noting that the Hicks Court
“expressly limited its holding to “the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers
enforcing state law,”72 the Tenth Circuit stated “Thus, the question before us is whether this case
sufficiently mirrors Hicks so as to compel its narrow holding to apply.”73
The Court went on to observe that the facts in this case were much different from those in
Hicks since the tribal member who died from the gun shot was not suspected of having
committed any off-reservation crime. Although the driver of the car was speeding outside of the
Reservation, Murray (the tribal member who died) was merely a passenger. Thus, the Court
concluded by stating “To the extent that Murray’s running away from State Trooper Swenson
could be considered an offense, see Utah Code § 41-6a-209 (disobeying a lawful order of a law
enforcement officer), this crime does not fit within Hicks' confines.”74 In effect, the Tenth Circuit
in Norton took the position that in order for Hicks to be controlling, the State has to put forth a
substantial law enforcement interest.
3. The Ninth Circuit approach: From a narrow interpretation of Hicks to rejecting
the application of Montana when tribes have preserved the right to exclude.
The third category of cases are out of the Ninth Circuit. The first Ninth Circuit case to
discuss the meaning of Hicks, was McDonald v. Means.75 The issue involved an assertion of
tribal court jurisdiction over a tort resulting from a collision on a federal Bureau of Indian
69
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Id., at 1248.
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Affairs’ road. The non-member defendant argued that Hicks extended Montana to all lands
within the reservation. After noting that the Hicks Court had limited its holding to the question
of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the limited nature of Hicks's holding was not applicable to this case. Among the
distinguishing factors was the fact that the Tribe here had continued to exercise control over the
road where the incident took place. 76
Perhaps the first 9th Circuit decision to discuss the role of the right to exclude in a Montana
analysis was Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court.77 The issue was whether the tribal
court had jurisdiction to hear a case brought by the tribe against a non-member who set a signal
fire after she got lost on the reservation and that fire ended up burning 400,000 acres of tribal
timber. After acknowledging that determining the scope of tribal court jurisdiction was not an
easy task, the court noted that here, it only needed to determine whether tribal jurisdiction was
plausible since the issue was whether the non-member had to first exhaust her tribal remedies
before filing her case in federal court. 78 In deciding that tribal jurisdiction was in fact plausible,
the 9th Circuit Court examined the Supreme Court precedents and noted
The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that a tribe may regulate nonmembers'
conduct on tribal lands to the extent that the tribe can “assert a landowner's right to
occupy and exclude. The tribal regulations at issue stem from the tribe's “landowner's
right to occupy and exclude.”… Accordingly, the tribe's ownership of the land may be
dispositive here.79
The Court further rejected the argument that Hicks precluded tribal jurisdiction. Although the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Hicks Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction
notwithstanding tribal ownership of the land, it stated that “the crux of the Court's reasoning was
that the state's strong interest in executing its criminal warrants concerning an off-reservation
crime outweighed the tribe's interest in regulating the activities of “state wardens.”80
76

Id., at 540.
566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009). An earlier case, Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (2006)
discussed Hicks but instead of discussing whether the tribe had kept its right to exclude, it focused on how
the claims were related to tribal land, stating “The interaction of these factors—the status of the parties
and the connection between the cause of action and Indian lands—is complex…Our own cases, however,
suggest that whether tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant may turn on
how the claims are related to tribal lands.“ Id., at 1132. A later 9th circuit opinion, Window Rock v.
Reeves, 861 F.3d 894 (2017), acknowledged that “Although Smith v. Salish Kootenai College could
arguably be read to extend the Montana framework [to Indian owned land], the jurisdictional question
in Smith arose in a different context from the one presented here. In Smith, a nonmember challenged a
tribal court’s authority to adjudicate a claim that he had filed as a plaintiff in tribal court. We held that by
filing the claim, the nonmember had consented to tribal jurisdiction.” Id., at Footnote 9.
78
Id., at 849. See discussion supra at note 42 on exhaustion tribal court remedies.
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The Ninth Circuit adopted a somewhat different approach in 2011 in what would become
its leading case, Water Wheel v. LaRance.81 The case arose out of a dispute involving a lease
between the Colorado Indian Tribes and its lessee, Water Wheel, which operated a recreational
resort on leased tribal lands. After the lease expired and Water Wheel refused to vacate the
premises, the Tribe sued Water Wheel and its owner in tribal Court. Water Wheel challenged the
jurisdiction of the tribal court in Federal court. Although the Ninth Circuit first stated that Hicks
was limited to cases involving strong state law enforcement interests,82 it ended upholding tribal
court jurisdiction over the non-Indian lessee on a slightly different rationale, stating
In this instance, where the non-Indian activity in question occurred on tribal land, the
activity interfered directly with the tribe's inherent powers to exclude and manage its own
lands, and there are no competing state interests at play, the tribe's status as landowner is
enough to support regulatory jurisdiction without considering Montana.83
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue two years later in Grand Canyon Skywalk
Development v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc.84 In that case, a non-Indian corporation, Grand Canyon
Skywalk, had brought a lawsuit against a tribally chartered corporation of the Hualapai Indian
Tribe, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn
Grand Canyon Skywalk’s property rights in a revenue-sharing contract with a tribally chartered
corporation. The Ninth Circuit held that the non-Indian Corporation had to exhaust its tribal
remedies before bringing an action in federal court because the tribal court did not plainly lack
jurisdiction over that corporation so as to avoid the tribal exhaustion mandate. 85
In extending Water Wheel to the present case, the court stated “Although this case
involves an intangible property right within a contract, rather than a leasehold as
in Water Wheel, the contract in this case equally interfered with the Hualapai's ability to exclude
GCSD from the reservation.”86 Summarizing its interpretation of Hicks, the Court stated “ When
deciding whether a tribal court has jurisdiction, land ownership may sometimes prove
dispositive, but when a competing state interest exists, courts balance that interest against the
tribe's.”87
81

642 F.3d 802 9th Cir. 2011).
Id., at 813. stating “To summarize, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as the principle
that only Congress may limit a tribe's sovereign authority, suggest that Hicks is best understood as the
narrow decision it explicitly claims to be. Its application of Montana to a jurisdictional question arising
on tribal land should apply only when the specific concerns at issue in that case exist.”
83
642 F.3d 802, 814.
84
715 F.3d 1196 (2013)
85
The Grand Canyon Skywalk court further stated “We have interpreted National Farmers as determining
that tribal court exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal court's exercise
of its jurisdiction. Therefore, under National Farmers, the federal courts should not even make a ruling on
tribal court jurisdiction ... until tribal remedies are exhausted.” Id., at 1200.
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Id., at 1204–05.
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Extending Hicks to the activities of non-members on tribal land was also at play in
Window Rock Unified District v. Reeves.88 There, employees of two school districts filed
complaints with the Navajo Tribal Labor Commission, arguing that the Districts owed them
merit pay and also alleging violation of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act . Before the
Commission could hold evidentiary hearings, the School Districts filed a lawsuit in federal court,
arguing that the Commission and the Navajo tribal courts had no jurisdiction over the School
Districts’ employment decisions. As in the Grand Canyon Skywalk case, the issue in front of the
Ninth Circuit was whether the School District should exhaust its tribal remedies before filing in
federal court.
The Ninth Circuit first remarked that caselaw has recognized two distinct frameworks for
deciding tribal jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned lands: “(1) The right to exclude
which generally applies to nonmember conducts on tribal land and (2) the exceptions articulated
in Montana v. United States which generally apply to nonmember conduct on non-tribal land.”89
Answering arguments that Hicks had eliminated the right to exclude framework the court stated
[t]oday we reaffirm that the right-to-exclude framework continues to exist. Our court has
read Hicks as creating only a narrow exception to the general rule that, absent contrary
provisions in treaties or federal statutes, tribes retain adjudicative authority over
nonmember conduct on tribal land—land over which the tribe has the right to exclude.
We have held that Hicks applies “only when the specific concerns at issue in that case
exist.”90
One of the issues in the case was whether Arizona’s interests in regulating education
were sufficiently important to meet the Hicks threshold. Although the Court rejected the
position adopted by the District Court that “any state interest in this case plainly defeats [tribal]
jurisdiction under Hicks,” it took the position that even though Hicks involved state interests
dealing with law enforcement, state interests beyond those affecting criminal law enforcement
could at times trigger application of Hicks.91 However, the Ninth Circuit concluded by holding
that “because our caselaw leaves open the question of what state interests might be sufficient to
preclude tribal jurisdiction over disputes arising on tribal land, tribal jurisdiction is plausible
enough here that exhaustion is required.”92
There was a strong dissent from Judge Christen. Although the dissent argued against a
narrow interpretation of Hicks,93 the more salient part of the dissenting opinion was its argument
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that even if the majority was correct in adopting a narrow interpretation of Hicks, the Tribe still
did not have jurisdiction.94 First, the tribe had ceded its right to exclude the school district from
the reservation.95 Secondly, even if Hicks is interpreted as requiring a strong state interest before
the Montana framework can be invoked, Arizona here did have a substantial interest relating to
education.96
The Reeves dissent considered the State interest but not as part of its right to exclude
analysis or the Montana analysis. Instead, it analyzed the state interest in distinguishing previous
cases such as Water Wheel. Either the state interest can be discussed as opening the door for a
Montana analysis or it can be conceived as having eliminated the right to exclude. Although
either analysis end up at the same place, this Article takes the position that it is normatively more
consistent to discuss the state interests in order to determine whether a tribe has lost the right to
exclude.
The most recent Ninth Circuit decision in this area of the law as of this writing is
Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria.97 The case involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court by the tribe
against a former non-member employee who was being accused of having defrauded the Tribe.
The employee sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court claiming that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction. In upholding tribal jurisdiction the Ninth Circuit first rejected the
employee’s claim that Hicks had eliminated “the right to exclude framework as an independent
source or regulatory power over non-member conduct on tribal land.”98 The Court also rejected
the argument that tribal jurisdiction is “limited to conduct that directly interferes with a tribe’s
inherent power to exclude and manage its own land. 99 Finally the Court clarified the meaning of
Water Wheel, stating
Water Wheel and our subsequent cases… do not exclude Montana as a source of tribal
regulatory authority over nonmember conduct on tribal land. Rather, our caselaw states
that an Indian tribe has power to regulate nonmember conduct on tribal land incident to
94

Unlike the majority the dissent concluded that exhaustion of tribal remedies was not required. Id., at
921-922.
95
Id., at 914-916.
96
Id., at 916-918, stating “The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s amicus brief asserts interests in protecting
Navajo employees and students, and the tribal court’s opening brief asserts interests in hearing complaints
arising from employment decisions of all-Navajo school boards. But the school boards are political
subdivisions of the State of Arizona, and Arizona has vitally important competing interests in the finality
of its state-court judgments and its ability to enforce them. Further, Arizona’s constitution mandates “the
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system,” a requirement of the
Arizona Enabling Act. It cannot be questioned that Arizona has a compelling interest in complying with
its statutory and state constitutional mandate.” Id., at 917.
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922 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Id., at 900.
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Id., at 901.
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its sovereign power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land, regardless of whether either
of the Montana exceptions is satisfied… a tribe's power to regulate nonmember conduct
on tribal land flows from its inherent power to exclude and is circumscribed only to
the limited extent that the circumstances in Hicks—significant state interests—are
present.100
4. Conclusion to Part II and re-imagining Hicks as a state Jurisdiction case.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit position as clarified in Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria is the
more doctrinally sound approach among the Circuits.101 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks should
be interpreted as creating a two-step analysis before tribal jurisdiction over non-members on
Indian-owned land could be said to have been divested. First, a court should determine if the
Tribe has lost the right to exclude. If the answer is yes, the court should determine if the tribe can
exercise jurisdiction under one of the two Montana exceptions.
Conceptualizing Hicks in that manner makes the most sense out of Justice Scalia’s invocation
of the State interest. Although considering the state interests either as divesting the tribes’ of the
right to exclude or as part of the Montana analysis may lead to the same result, construing
Scalia’s opinion as integrating a state interest into the Montana analysis lacks any doctrinal
basis. The implicit divestiture doctrine was never about tribes losing inherent sovereignty
because of a state interest. The State interest should only be taken into consideration in
determining whether a tribe has lost its inherent right to exclude.
There is hardly any law on what kind of state interest is sufficient or important enough to
overcome a tribe’s right to exclude. Whether the important state interest has to be related to law
enforcement is debatable. For instance, in answering Justice O’Connor’s accusation that the
Court’s opinion would “give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based
solely on their status as state law enforcement officials,”102 Justice Scalia stated “We do not say
state officers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be regulated in the performance of their
law enforcement duties. Action unrelated to that is potentially subject to tribal control depending
on the outcome of the Montana analysis.”103 Although I do not take the position that a state
interest has to be tied to law enforcement as it was in Hicks, it seems to me that the state interest
should somehow be connected to state officials needing to be on Indian owned land or having the
legal right to be on such lands.
Id., at 903. The Ninth Circuit also added that a “tribe also has sovereign authority to regulate
nonmember conduct on tribal lands independent of its authority to exclude if that conduct intrudes on a
tribe's inherent sovereign power to preserve self-government or control internal relations.” Id., at 904.
101
For an even better approach, see discussion supra at notes…. About re-imagining Hicks as a state
jurisdiction case.
102
Id., at 373.
103
Id., at 373-374.
100

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706460

19

In order to avoid all the confusion surrounding the proper understanding of Hicks, perhaps
that case should not be viewed as tinkering with the Montana analysis by introducing a balancing
of tribal and state interest but should be re-imagined as a State Jurisdiction case. In other words,
rather than decide the case using Montana to hold that the tribal court had been implicitly
divested of jurisdiction, the Court should have used the Indian Preemption doctrine to hold that
because the State had jurisdiction to send its game wardens on the reservation, tribal jurisdiction
to regulate such state officials had been preempted.
Under the Indian preemption doctrine, as stated by the Court in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker,104 the inquiry determining whether a state has jurisdiction “is not dependent on
mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would
violate federal law.”105 In a case decided shortly thereafter, the Court further refined the Indian
Preemption doctrine as a balancing inquiry, stating “State jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of
State authority.”106
At one point in the Court’s Hicks opinion, it seemed that Justice Scalia was going to do
such a balancing inquiry. Thus, after stating that “Our cases make clear that the Indians' right to
make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on
the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border,” 107 Justice Scalia
focused on the right of states to run “process” inside the reservations which he claimed had been
recognized since the 1880’s.”108 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Process” as “any means used
by a court to acquire or exercise its jurisdiction over a person or over specific property.” 109
Justice Scalia added that “While it is not entirely clear from our precedent whether the last
mentioned authority entails the corollary right to enter a reservation (including Indian-fee lands)
for enforcement purposes, several of our opinions point in that direction.” 110
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448 U.S. 136 (1980).
Id., at 145.
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New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1980).
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Id., at 361.
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Stating “The Court's references to “process” in Utah & Northern R. Co. and Kagama, and the Court's
concern in Kagama over possible federal encroachment on state prerogatives, suggest state authority to
issue search warrants in cases such as the one before us.” Id., at 361.
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Justice Scalia also invoked Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation,111 for the proposition that states can even have jurisdiction over Indian tribes and
their members on Indian reservations.112 True enough, the Court has in the past stated that
“[U]nder certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of
nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction
over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.” 113 Following this reasoning, I was
expecting Justice Scalia to next argue that the State had the power to enter the reservation and
assume jurisdiction over Hicks because of exceptional circumstances, thereby abrogating the
tribe’s right to exclude. Justice Scalia could have then argued that the state law enforcement
interests in this case pre-empted tribal jurisdiction because dual tribal/state regulations over the
activities of state officials would have not been possible nor practical.
In that manner, the case could have been similar to New Mexico v. Mescalero Tribe but in
reverse.114 In Mescalero, the state was attempting to regulate non-members hunting and fishing
on the reservation but the Court held that such state regulations were preempted because, among
other things, both tribal and state regulations could not co-exist.115 For whatever reason, Justice
Scalia did not continue along this path and abruptly shifted to an implicit divestiture mode of
analysis, balancing the tribal and state interests not to determine whether the state should have
jurisdiction but to conclude that tribal jurisdiction in this case was not necessary to tribal selfgovernment.116
From a tribal perspective, however, I believe that it would have been better if the Court
had invoked exceptional circumstances and used the Indian preemption doctrine to affirm state
111

447 U.S. 134 (1980).
533 U.S. 353, 362, stating “When, however, state interests outside the reservation are implicated,
States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land, as exemplified by our
decision in Confederated Tribes. In that case, Indians were selling cigarettes on their reservation to
nonmembers from off reservation, without collecting the state cigarette tax. We held that the State could
require the Tribes to collect the tax from nonmembers, and could “impose at least ‘minimal’ burdens on
the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and collecting the tax.”
113
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214–16 (U.S.Cal.,1987).
114
462 U.S. 324 (1980).
115
Id., at 338, stating “It is important to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify
the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would
empower New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The State would be able to dictate the terms
on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources. The Tribe would thus exercise
its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State.”
116
533 U.S. 353, at 364. Perhaps Justice Scalia abandoned this line of reasoning because even though the
Court had used the Indian preemption inquiry to allow state power over Indians under “exceptional
circumstances,” it had never used the Indian preemption doctrine to prohibit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. But that is probably dues to the fact that most of the state jurisdiction cases are tax cases and in
the tax area, concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction is possible. See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1988).
112
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jurisdiction in order to preempt tribal jurisdiction. There would have been then no need to further
denigrate tribal sovereignty and there would have been no questions that the implicit divestiture
doctrine was being extended to Indian owned land.
PART III: THE TREATY RIGHT TO EXCLUDE BEYOND MONTANA AND HICKS.
1. Is the treaty right to exclude different than the sovereign right to exclude?
Although tribes have been surprisingly successful in getting the Supreme Court to uphold
their treaty rights, the same cannot be said for cases relying on tribal inherent sovereignty to
control the conduct of non-tribal members.117 The question, therefore, is whether tribes with a
treaty right to exclude may be better off focusing on their treaty rights rather than on their
“inherent” sovereign power to exclude. Some scholars do not think it makes much difference.
One of the more forceful statement for treating both treaty and non-treaty reservations alike was
made by Professor Royster,
If tribes with reservations established by statute or executive order have the same rights
to water and the same rights to hunt and fish as tribes with reservations established by
treaty, then by what argument would they not have the same right to the use and
occupation of their lands? …Particular treaties, statutes, or executive orders may speak of
a tribal right to use and occupy the reservation, but that language merely clarifies or
affirms the federal guarantee implicit in the establishment of the reservation. Whether
that use and occupation right arises from an actual treaty or the treaty-equivalent of a
statute or executive order should make no difference.118
While I do not disagree with Professor Royster’s statement, I think the difference between an
inherent sovereign right and a treaty right to exclude comes in when a court has to determine
whether the right to exclude has been lost. Under my interpretation of Hicks, without a treaty, a
court would have to decide whether there are state interests that are important enough so that the
tribe has lost the right to exclude. If the right to exclude is based on a treaty, however, the
question should be whether there are clear indications of congressional intent to abrogate the
treaty right to exclude.119

See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for
Equilibrium or Supremacy, 8 Colum. J. Race & L. 277, at 287-289 (2018).
118
See Royster, supra at n. 13, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 889, 921.
119
See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Stating “where the evidence of congressional intent to
abrogate is sufficiently compelling, “the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also be
found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute.” What
is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty.” Id., at 739–40.
117
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Some may argue that all Indian tribes, whether they have treaty rights or not, should be
treated equally and have the same rights on their own reservations. Such argument, however,
denigrates the historical and legal importance of treaties made with Indian nations. While it is
true that Federal Indian law has been homogenized, at first mostly through the Supreme Court’s
use of Federal Common Law, and then by federal statutes treating all Indian tribes generically,
this was not always so. For about the first one hundred years, except for the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts,120 the relations between the federal government and each Indian tribe was
mostly governed through particular treaties. 121 Some noted scholars, such as Vine Deloria and
Saikrishna Prakash, have criticized the move towards homogenization, 122 arguing that such move
was made for the purpose of assuming federal power over Indians. 123 Certainly, the so-called
federal plenary power doctrine over Indian tribes and the implicit divestiture doctrine are fine
examples of this strategy.
In the next section I discuss then differences between the inherent and treaty right to
exclude has fared in two Supreme Court cases. One was based on the inherent sovereign right to
exclude, the other on a treaty right to exclude.
2. The treaty and sovereign right to exclude at the Supreme Court.
A. Merrion v. Jicarilla Tribe: 124 The right to exclude as a sovereign right.
A year after Montana, the Court had the opportunity to debate the right to exclude as an
inherent sovereign right. The issue in Merrion involved the Jicarilla Apache’s power to impose
an additional tax on a non-Indian corporation, Merrion, that had leased lands from the tribe for
the purpose of energy development. Merrion argued that because its lease with the tribe did not
provide for the imposition of new taxes, the tribal tax was precluded. The Court upheld the new
tribal tax. The difference between the majority opinion penned by Justice Marshall and the
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The first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act was enacted in 1790, Act of July 22, 1 Stat 137. The last
one was enacted in 1834, 4 Stat. 729.
121
In 1871, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the United States from entering into treaties with
Indian Nations but reaffirming the validity of existing treaties, 16 Stat. 566 (March 3, 1871).
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See Vine Deloria Jr, Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 Ariz. L.
Rev. 963 (1996) (criticizing Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law because “it was designed to
present a homogenous body of law in which few questions remained” and concluding that “Newer
versions of the handbook have simply built upon old and weak foundations, failing to articulate either
Indian rights or federal responsibility clearly. Id., at 979)
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See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069 (2004). See also Ezra
Rosser. Ambiguity and the Academic: The dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. F. 141 (2005).
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455 U.S. 130, 145–47 (1982).
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dissent by Justice Stevens centered on the nature of the power to exclude and whether the tribal
power to tax derived solely from the power to exclude.
Justice Marshall took the position that the tribal power to tax could be derived from either
inherent tribal sovereignty or the right to exclude which includes other lesser rights such as
regulating the terms under which anyone not excluded can remain on tribal lands. Justice
Stevens argued that the power to tax non-members derived solely from the power to exclude and
since the lease did not provide for additional taxes, Merrion could not be excluded for refusing to
pay such taxes. Justice Marshall had this to say about the dissent’s argument:
[t]he dissent confuse the Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign…
Confusing these two results denigrates Indian sovereignty. Indeed, the dissent apparently
views the tribal power to exclude, as well as the derivative authority to tax, as merely the
power possessed by any individual landowner or any social group to attach conditions,
including a “tax” or fee, to the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the social
group, and not as a sovereign power.”125
The tribal right in Merrion was, however, a non-treaty right to exclude. As noted by Justice
Marshall, the difference between the majority and the dissent centered on whether the tribal right
to exclude was an inherent “sovereign” right or a property owner’s right.
B. South Dakota v. Bourland:126 The right to exclude as a treaty right.
The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had kept its treaty right
to exclude non-members from hunting on land that was within the reservation but had been taken
from the tribe for a federal dam and reservoir project. Relying on Montana, the Court in an
opinion authored by Justice Thomas held that the Tribe’s treaty right to exclude non-members
from the reservation, implicit in its rights of “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation,” of
such lands, as well as its derivative right to regulate non-members while on these lands, was
implicitly abrogated when the United States took the lands and opened them for the use of the
general public.127
The Court also argued that its decision was not in contravention of United States v. Dion,128
where the Court had held that a treaty right can only be abrogated if there is “clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.” 129 The
Court concluded that it could not explain Section 10 of the Cheyenne River Act and section 4 of
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the Flood Control Act except as “indications that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right
to “absolute use and occupation.”130 That conclusion was strongly objected to by the dissent
which stated that the majority:
points not even to a scrap of evidence that Congress actually considered the possibility
that by taking the land in question it would deprive the Tribe of its authority to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing on that land. Instead, it finds Congress' intent implicit in
the fact that Congress deprived the Tribe of its right to exclusive use of the land. 131
The Dissent also remarked that although the Court acknowledged the application of cases like
Dion to this case, “the majority adopts precisely the sort of reasoning-by-implication that those
cases reject.”132
The Dissent also accused the majority of having a “myopic focus on the Treaty” and ignoring
the fact that Treaties just confirmed Tribes’ pre-existing sovereign rights over their
reservations.133 Therefore, according to the dissent “Even on the assumption that the Tribe's
treaty-based right to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians was lost with the Tribe's power
to exclude non-Indians, its inherent authority to regulate such hunting and fishing continued.” 134
In effect, although Justice Thomas did state that “General principles of “inherent sovereignty”
also do not enable the Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area,”135 his
majority opinion in fact remanded the question of whether either of the two Montana exceptions
applied to the lower court.136
3. The treaty right to exclude beyond jurisdiction over non-members: Applying federal
laws of general applicability to Indian tribes.
Besides being relevant in determining tribal jurisdiction over non-members, the distinction
between inherent sovereign rights and treaty rights has also played a role in the on-going debate
among the Circuits about extending federal laws of general applicability to Indian tribes. These
are general federal law that do not mention Indian tribes in either the text or the legislative
history.137 There are currently three official approaches among the Circuits in deciding whether
to apply a general federal law to Indian tribes. Under the prevailing approach, first formulated
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by the 9th Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene, 138 there is a presumption that federal laws that
are generally applicable to everyone are also applicable to Indian tribes.139 The tribes can,
however, rebut this presumption by showing that the general federal law would interfere with
“purely intramural aspects of tribal Sovereignty.” 140 Under the D.C. Circuit approach as
formulated in San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB,141 the focus is on whether the general federal law
would interfere with traditional powers of tribal self-government.142 The Tenth Circuit, on the
other hand, assumes that any federal law applied to tribes would interfere with tribal selfgovernment and therefore requires clear indications of congressional intent to apply the law to
the tribes.143
While all three approaches acknowledge that the general federal law should not be
applied to Indian tribes if it interferes with some aspects of tribal self-government, they also
agree that a general federal law should not be applied if it interferes with a specific treaty right
unless there is clear evidence that Congress considered the matter and decided to abrogate the
treaty right.144 This indicates that in this area of the law, Tribes having a treaty right to exclude
may be better off than those with just a sovereign right to exclude. Finding clear evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty can, however, be a subjective inquiry. The Supreme
Court in both Montana and Bourland, for instance, found clear indications of congressional
intent to eliminate the treaty right to exclude as to non-Indian owned land when Congress had
either transferred the land to non-Indian ownership, or provided a mechanism for non-Indians to
acquire land within Indian reservations. 145
When it comes to invoking a treaty right to prevent application of a federal law of general
applicability, the debate has centered on what kind of treaty right qualifies. Is a treaty that
reserves the Indian reservation “for the exclusive use” of the tribe and its members, specific
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enough to qualify under the approaches described above. In United States v. Farris 146 for
instance, the Ninth Circuit stated the treaty exception applied “only to subjects specifically
covered in treaties, such as hunting rights . . . To bring the special rule into play here, general
treaty language such as that devoting land to a tribe's ‘exclusive use’ is not sufficient, although
such language does suffice to oust state jurisdiction.”147
The Ninth Circuit has continued to follow this position. For instance, in Department of
Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,148 the issue was the application of
OSHA to a tribally owned enterprise. Because the treaty created the reservation for the exclusive
use of the tribe and stated that “nor shall any white person be permitted to reside upon the same
without the concurrent permission of the agent and superintendent,” the Occupational Safety and
Health Commission concluded that the treaty “evidence an intent of the parties to exclude the
white man from the reservation lands for any and all purposes except as therein
enumerated.”149 Therefore, according to the Commission, the application of OSHA to the tribe
would infringe on the tribe's right to exclusive use. On Appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed,
stating, “on the facts before us, we do not find the conflict between the Tribe's right of general
exclusion and the limited entry necessary to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act to
be sufficient to bar application of the Act to the Warm Springs mill. The conflict must be more
direct to bar the enforcement of statutes of general applicability.”150
The Seventh Circuit has followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit. In Smart v. State
Farm,151 where the issue was application of ERISA to a tribal healthcare center, the Seventh
Circuit stated, “Simply because a treaty exists does not by necessity compel a conclusion that a
federal statute of general applicability is not binding on an Indian Tribe…The critical issue is
whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the treaty.” 152 The
Court concluded that the treaty in question here did not delineate specific rights. The treaty
simply conveyed land to be within the exclusive sovereignty of the Tribe.
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a different position on the treaty
exception. In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products,153 the Tenth Circuit held that OSHA was not
applicable to the tribe because the treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation provided that only
designated federal officials could enter the Navajo reservation. 154 Since applying OSHA would
146

624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980.)
147
Id., at 893
148
935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir 1991).
149
Id., at 184-85.
150
Id., at 186-87.
151
868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
152
Id., at 935
153
692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982),
154
Article II of the treaty, states as follows: [T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein
so authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the government, or of the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706460

27

allow federal employees to enter the reservation at any times in order to enforce the statute, the
court stated
The Navajo Treaty recognizes the Indian sovereignty of the Navajos and their right of
self-government . . . Application of OSHA to NFPI [Navajo Forest Products Inc.] would
constitute abrogation of Article II of the Navajo Treaty relating to the exclusion of nonIndians not authorized to enter upon the Navajo Reservation. Furthermore, it would dilute
the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty. 155
The Tenth Circuit applied Navajo Forest Products in EEOC v. Cherokee
where the issue was application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) to the Cherokee Nation. Remarking that in Navajo Forest Products, the court had
found that application of OSHA would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and selfgovernment recognized in the treaty, the Cherokee Nation court concluded, “The treaty's
language clearly and unequivocally recognizes tribal self-government with only two express
exceptions, neither of which is at issue in this case . . . Consequently, we hold that ADEA is not
applicable because its enforcement would directly interfere with the Cherokee Nation's treatyprotected right of self-government.”157
Nation,156

The difference of opinion between the 9th and 10th Circuit concerning how specific a
treaty right has to be before it can prevent the application of a general federal law came to the
fore more recently in Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB,158 a case involving application of the
National Labor Relations Act to a tribal casino. After acknowledging a split between the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits on one side and the Tenth on the other, the Sixth Circuit recognized that
“the question was a close one” but concluded that a treaty right to exclude was insufficient to bar
application of federal regulatory statutes of general applicability, at least in the absence of a
“direct conflict between a specific right or exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the
statutory scheme.”159

Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or
the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory
described in this article. Treaty with the Navaho, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
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Judge White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took a different view. Judge
White began by acknowledging that under Circuit precedent, the tribe’s inherent sovereignty
could not prevent the application of general federal law. However, the tribe’s treaty right was
another matter.”160 Disagreeing with the majority that the treaty right to exclude was not specific
enough, Judge White stated
As memorialized in the Treaty, in exchange for “relinquishing ... several townships” to
the federal government, the Tribe secured the “exclusive use, ownership, and occupancy”
of the remnant it retained. ..Surely, these signatories who just gave up a significant
portion of their homeland, would not have understood their right to the “exclusive use,
ownership, and occupancy” of their remaining land to be limited, non-specific, or subject
to regulation regarding the conditions the Tribe might impose on those it permitted to
enter. On the contrary, the Tribe would reasonably have understood this provision to
mean that the federal government could not dictate, in any way, what the Tribe did on the
land it retained.161
Judge White concluded that “Absent Congress's express direction to the contrary, the Tribe's
treaty-based exclusionary right is sufficient to preclude application of the NLRA to the Tribe's
on- reservation Casino.”162
CONCLUSION:
A treaty right to exclude is more valuable to the tribes because in order for this right to be
abrogated a party has to show clear evidence of congressional intent to that effect. The Supreme
Court has, however, found such clear evidence when Congress has allowed Indian land to be
transferred to non-members. In addition, most courts have generally required treaty rights to
have a certain level of specificity before acknowledging that they may give more rights than
what tribes already have under their inherent sovereign powers. Finally, it is important to note
that while tribes have been successful at the Supreme Court when it comes to defending their
treaty rights, just about all of the Indian treaty cases have involved off reservation hunting,
fishing, or gathering rights.163 Although one of the later cases involved a treaty right to avoid
state fuel taxes on trucks using state highways to reach the reservation, 164 that case also involved

As she put it, “It well may be that when a tribe's inherent sovereignty rights are broadly interpreted, its
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off reservation activities. Moreover, none of the cases involved using a treaty right to control the
activities or non-tribal members as would be the case when invoking the treaty right to exclude.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks is not a model of clarity and lends itself to
different interpretations. This Article has argued that while each of the three interpretations can
find support in the language used in Hicks, the more doctrinally sounder interpretation among the
circuits, is the one adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Under that version, before the Montana
analysis can be applied to potentially divest Indian tribes of jurisdiction over Indian owned
reservation lands, the parties arguing against tribal jurisdiction have to show a state interest
important enough to neutralize the tribal right to exclude. This article has also argued, however,
that an even better way to proceed would be to re-imagine or re-conceptualize Hicks as a state
jurisdiction case.
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